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Abstract 
In this article, we draw on two clinical ethnographies to explore how mundane 
social practices, affective processes, and cultural materials (re)produce divisions and 
forms of in/exclusion. By treating everyday life and routines as serious categories of 
analysis, we identify how power relations are accomplished and how 
persons/future persons – namely the ‘dysmorphic’ child or the foetus who has or 
may have Down’s syndrome – are constituted as un/valued or in/excluded. In 
relation to dysmorphology, we show how the living dysmorphic child is given 
shelter but future reproductions of such children are enacted negatively and as to be 
avoided. With reference to Down’s syndrome, we capture how the condition is made 
absent in the antenatal clinic and constituted as a negative outcome. In sum, we 
recognise how exploring the micro and everyday reveals who/what is valued and 
how particular ways of being in the world are threatened, denied, or effaced. 
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Introduction 
This paper explores how everyday life in the clinic is productive and reproductive of 
ideas around persons, kinships, and being human, with profound implications for 
the make-up of contemporary society. To exemplify our argument, we draw upon 
ethnographies undertaken in two clinics. The first study focuses on a sub-specialism 
in medical genetics, dysmorphology, drawing together diagnosis and genetic 
counselling in the assessment and analysis of babies, children, and families 
suspected of having a congenital problem (Featherstone et al., 2005; Latimer, 2013; 
Latimer et al., 2006). The second study is based on prenatal screening for Down’s 
syndrome, a routine procedure in many countries across Europe and the US 
(Thomas, 2014b). Both studies examine interactions between medicine, bioscience, 
and the family, including biotechnologies and clinical processes on the one hand and 
family members, bodies, and selves on the other. The clinic is, then, the intermediary 
between these domains. 
Here, we focus on how dysmorphology and Down syndrome screening are 
done at the everyday level, including how different clinical processes are conducted 
in interactions between patients, families, and practitioners. Additionally, we 
examine how cases/patients and interpretations of conditions or bodies are 
assembled in interaction. We show how these processes and practices accomplish the 
relation between certain forms of being and societal values to (re)create the 
conditions of possibility for stigma and the exclusion of some forms of life rather 
than others. We also capture how this instantiates how bio-politics is accomplished 
at the ‘capillaries’ (Foucault, 1980). As Haraway (1991: 203) suggests: 
 
‘The power of biomedicine and biotechnology is constantly re-produced, or it 
would cease. This power is not a thing, fixed and permanent, embedded in 
plastic and ready to section for microscopic observation by the historian or 
critic. The cultural and material authority of biomedicine’s productions of 
bodies and selves is more vulnerable, more dynamic, more elusive, and more 
powerful than that’. 
 
The arguments of this article share similarities with earlier ethnographies in 
healthcare institutions concerning how practitioners and others accomplish medical 
work in daily interactions, practices, and routines (Bosk, 1992; Silverman, 1987). Our 
methodological approach corresponds with classic interactionist work on the clinic 
around the complex interactions between practitioners, parents, and children (Davis, 
1982; Strong, 1979; Strong and Davis, 1976), particularly the significance of 
‘discourse’ (Silverman, 1981, 1987) and ideas around family, responsibility, and 
disease/illness. However, we extend this vital work in several ways. First, we 
explore where, and when, medicine is explicitly engaged with genetics and 
reproductive technologies. Here, unlike earlier studies, we treat family, relatedness, 
conception, and birth as explicit subjects and objects of clinical processes and 
practices (see also Rapp, 2000; Rothman, 1986) to highlight how ideas around 
persons, kinships, and being human are constituted. 
Second, we bring together Foucauldian concerns with bio-politics and other 
theoretical sensibilities – ‘disposal’ (Latimer, 1997; Berg, 1992), ‘absence/presence’, 
and ‘motility’ (Latimer, 2013; Munro, 1996) – to analyse how people or things are 
moved in different spaces of discourse to accomplish stabilities in power relations 
(Latour, 1991). Whilst we focus on the explicit as well as the implicit and taken-for-
granted (Pink, 2012), we are as interested in moments of deviation and apparent 
contradiction as we are in routines, repetitions, and what is ‘normal’ in the settings 
observed. Sociologies of everyday life usually press routines and repetitions as 
productive of social relations (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). In contrast, as well as 
routines and repetitions, we focus on moments and occasions in which practitioners 
consume, hold in play, dispose of, and shift between supposedly contradictory 
frames of meaning and values. Rather than these shifts and moves being seen simply 
as ‘deviations’ (Silverman 1993) from a norm, or as infractions through which people 
mark others as different (Goffman, 1963), we examine what we call ‘shifts’ in 
extension (Latimer, 2004; Munro, 1996; Strathern, 1991) as both ‘topic’ and ‘resource’ 
(Garfinkel, 1967) for how participants attach to, and detach from, specific ethical 
concerns and moral forms; that is, everyday practices of in/exclusion that dispose of 
particular forms of life and give shelter to others. 
We begin by describing the theoretical foundations on which our arguments 
are grounded. In what follows, we outline our studies before exploring how in the 
dysmorphology clinic, the living child is given shelter but, simultaneously, future 
reproductions of such children are enacted negatively and to be avoided; this 
reproduces dominant Euro-American forms of personhood, circulating notions of 
agency, will, and calculation. With reference to Down’s syndrome, we capture how 
the condition is made absent and constituted as a negative pregnancy outcome. The 
article has two major contributions. Firstly, it identifies in/exclusionary practices in 
the clinic and how particular ways of being in the world are threatened, denied, or 
effaced. Secondly, it reveals how attending to the micro, banal, and everyday life of 
the clinic reveals who or what is valued in modern healthcare institutions and the 
contemporary social world. In doing so, we recognise how everyday situations and 
power relations, always local and specific yet also complex and heterogeneous 
(Foucault, 1973), are important for considering how people and ‘the social’ get 
un/made in everyday life. 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Concerns 
The methodological tradition in which our studies are rooted draws together aspects 
of interactionism and ethnomethodology with post-structural interests in power 
relations, allowing us to engage with a particular way of analysing the social. 
Despite drawing on several concepts, we analyse the mundane, familiar, and taken-
for-granted ‘micro’ practices, routines, and rituals which reproduce order and values 
(Garfinkel, 1967; Goffman, 1959). This corresponds to how stabilities are re-
accomplished not just through how matters are settled, but also through how they 
become ‘unsettled’ (Latimer, 2008). 
Our work focuses largely on interactions between practitioners, patients, and 
families, revealing how the intricate politics of small rules and transgressions add up 
to ordinary yet powerful symbolic ceremonies in everyday life (Goffman, 1959). 
Analysing the extraordinariness of ordinariness reveals the subtle scaffolding of 
interaction and how people – as ‘members’ (Garfinkel, 1967) – make sense of their 
world and produce a local order through taken-for-granted practices and conduct. 
With Garfinkel (1967: 11), we understand the meaning being registered and the sense 
being made as ‘indexical’ to the situation; ‘the demonstrable rationality of indexical 
expressions and indexical actions retains over the course of its managed production 
by members the character of ordinary, familiar, routinised practical circumstances’. 
The artful practices of everyday life, for Garfinkel, create a moral order, that is, how 
people organise the world and local order. This is vital for considering the moral 
order of clinical life and how practitioners, patients, and families produce and 
reproduce particular moral values not only around everyday interactions but also 
around certain bodies/future bodies which appears as ‘natural’ and ‘real’. 
We also explore the micro-physics of power in the clinic. Foucault (1980) 
argues that power is not concentrated in one space or possessed by one person but is 
localised and fragmented. Invisible yet potent in its effects, power is realised in its 
reach ‘into the very grain of processes and everyday life’ (1980: 39); it ‘produces and 
traverses things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourses’ 
(1980: 119). In this article, we show how power works in the clinic, namely by 
examining how it facilitates, mobilises, and elicits the actions and conduct of those 
subjected to it. This is primarily achieved in discourse as described by Foucault, that 
is, in the culturally constructed language and practices of embodied individuals. 
Specifically, ‘discourses’ (Silverman 1987) are invoked, attached to, made 
present/absent, and resisted in different moments through different means. This 
makes up the social as a complex and not necessarily coherent tapestry of relations. 
In the clinic, we reveal how persons (and particularly practitioners) constitute 
persons/bodies and identities through ‘dividing practices’ (Foucault, 1983: 208) 
which create classifications, particularly those enacting a relationship between 
identity-work (parents, practitioners) and how people categorise the ‘objects’ and 
‘subjects’ of their interactions such as ‘foetus’, ‘baby’, or ‘child’ (Silverman 1987). 
Here, we explore shifts in ‘extension’ (Latimer, 2004, 2013; Munro, 1996; Strathern, 
1991). Specifically, we draw on post-structural sensibilities to expand interactionism 
through attention to how, when, and where participants attach to and detach from 
different materials, discourses, bodies, and technologies in ways that bring into 
presence, displace, or make absent different identities as well as different moral 
worlds.  As such, we show how people find consistency and stability in categories of 
people/future people to help perform identities and create order, but in ways that 
enact the clinic as a site of inclusion and exclusion. This involves focusing not only 
on the accomplishment of medical routines but also on deviations. By crosschecking 
‘accounts’ (Garfinkel, 1967) with observations of what happens in the clinic, we are 
able to look across ‘situated occasions’ over time in a process of comparative 
interpretation to identify both patterns and deviations (Silverman, 1993). 
We interpret these deviations/shifts not as mistakes or ‘breaches’ (Garfinkel, 
1967) but as instances of ‘motility’, referring to how people or things are moved not 
just via discourse, but via shifts in extension. We capture what people make present 
and absent, view as important and unimportant, and who or what they categorise as 
normal and abnormal, at different moments in the clinic. Motility essentially helps 
‘re-accomplish socio-cultural relations of power’ and brings concerns and 
attachments into view (Latimer, 2008). Analysing motility also allows us to explore 
relations enabling ‘disposal’ (Latimer, 1997). We understand disposal as the means 
by which persons engage in ordering work to help maintain order in the clinic, that 
is, how they place, displace, and replace certain persons, ideas, or things (Munro, 
1996). Thus, we relate the concept of disposal to how people erect an understanding 
of certain persons/future persons and how they can be transformed into an Other at 
different moments (Berg, 1992; Goffman, 1963). 
Here, we identify the theoretical undercurrents informing our approach. By 
exploring the ordinary and banal, we show how social relations and practices are 
equally mundane and dynamic and how local matters are important for grasping the 
life of the clinic as a site of bio-politics (Rapp, 2000; Silverman, 1987). Our claims are 
not an attempt to synthesise the entire principles of ethnomethodology, post-
structuralism, and interactionism. Rather, we draw on conceptual tools from each of 
these approaches, rather than fully subscribing to them, to make our claims. It is not, 
therefore, a total theoretical framework intent on integrating concepts which are, by 
all accounts, difficult to amalgamate. We believe that by bringing together these 
principles – alongside the tropes of motility, disposal, and absence/presence – we 
offer a novel contribution to the field. 
We will now briefly introduce the two studies from which the current article 
is drawn. Both studies were carried out in the UK National Health Service (NHS) 
contexts; one in a regional genetics service (dysmorphology) and another in a 
regional obstetrics and foetal medicine service (Down’s syndrome screening). As 
such, we argue that our findings will likely be translatable, despite local 
effects/variations, to other hospitals, an example being the universality of policy 
stipulations for Down’s syndrome screening in NHS hospitals. 
 
Study 1: Dysmorphology 
The first study is an ethnography of dysmorphology and, more generally, the 
practices and processes of clinical genetics (Latimer, 2013). Dysmorphology experts 
define themselves as concerned with the study of abnormal forms. The focus is on 
identifying which ‘troubles’ at the clinic are clinically pathological and examining 
the effects of congenital abnormalities/anomalies at the genetic level. In this sense, 
dysmorphology is entangled with the (bio)‘politics of reproduction’ (Ginsburg and 
Rapp, 1991). At the same time, it helps to produce, and embed, the post-genomic 
science of development, shape, and form. Patients are mainly babies, children, and 
kin relations, particularly parents and grandparents. Dysmorphology diagnosis 
works at the boundaries between genetic techno-science, discourses of ‘normal’ 
development, medicine, and the family. 
Dysmorphologists identify patterns in facial and other features, and in clinical 
and family histories, in the construction of what they call ‘syndromes’. Classification 
therefore proceeds not in terms of diseases per se but in terms of syndromes which 
includes both pathological and non-pathological signs and features, especially how 
bodies, including faces, look. Some of the children presenting at the clinic have severe 
troubles: problems of growth, brain shape and form, hearts, kidneys, and 
reproductive organs causing problems with function, with an extremely poor 
prognosis in several cases. Pathology at the genetic level is productive of syndromes 
which are holistic – they work across systems – and are, in addition, something that 
both someone and a family is. Thus, diagnostic categories are complex and 
associated with chromosomal abnormalities and genetic mutations. However, for 
many syndromes, no mutation has yet been made visible at the molecular level. 
Even in a syndrome where the mutation at the genetic level has been made visible, 
the pathway from the mutation to clinical picture is still unclear. At the time of the 
study, there were over 3000 syndromes described in dysmorphology databases. The 
clinic observed is particularly focused on establishing whether the syndrome that a 
child and/or their family express, the phenotype, has a genetic base or genotype. 
Importantly, treatment and care are difficult to measure because geneticists do not 
treat patients. Rather, they diagnose and counsel them with regard to reproductive 
risks and diagnostic work itself is protracted and uncertain. In a sense, geneticists’ 
practices concern the circulation and interpretation of information through which 
they attempt to, indirectly, re-form those families where they think there is risk of a 
genetic disorder being passed on. 
Fieldwork was an intensive year-long observational study of a regional 
genetics service with different teams consisting of consultants of clinical genetics 
who were also clinical scientists, genetics specialist nurses, and associated clinical 
trainees. The study was carried out in November 2002-July 2003. Participant 
observation was triangulated with interviews with patients/families (n=26) and 
international experts in dysmorphology (n=6), and discourse analysis of health 
policy, syndrome websites, geneticists’ publications, and other public 
representations of their knowledge and practice. Participant observation was across 
all the different occasions and events that make up dysmorphology practice and 
process, including clinical consultations (n=37), local, national and international 
professional dysmorphology meetings (n=6), and home visits (n=3). Many of the 
subjects were children and their families, which necessitated full involvement, 
consideration and consent of parents to participate in the study. Despite the 
extremely sensitive focus of the research, no unexpected ethical problems were 
encountered. 
In this article, only observations of the clinics are drawn upon. The clinics 
observed are small and in contrast to most other medical specialisms, consultations 
take about an hour and the diagnostic process occurs over a matter of years. 
Critically, there is often no diagnosis to be made and yet the diagnostic process runs 
alongside genetic counselling. That is, there is an assessment of risk over 
reproduction of children with the same kinds of pathologies and disabilities as those 
presenting at the clinic. 
 
Study 2: Down’s Syndrome Screening 
The second study is an ethnography of screening for Down’s syndrome in prenatal 
care (Thomas, 2014b, in press). Screening in the settings observed consists of parents 
receiving a ‘risk factor’, a numerical probability establishing the odds of a foetus 
having the condition. This categorises parents as ‘lower-risk’ or ‘higher-risk’. In NHS 
hospitals and the settings observed, the recommended national cut-off level for this 
categorisation is 1:150 (a 1 in 150 ‘risk’ of having a baby with Down’s syndrome). If 
parents receive a risk factor above 1:150 (e.g. 1:300), they are ‘lower-risk’ and not 
offered diagnostic testing (amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling/CVS). If they 
receive a risk factor below 1:150 (e.g. 1:50), they are ‘higher-risk’ and diagnostic 
testing can be arranged to prove or refute a suspected diagnosis. If parents decide 
against diagnostic testing, no further screening or testing for Down’s syndrome is 
typically offered. If parents consent to testing and a diagnosis is established, 
counselling is offered by a practitioner before a decision must be made about 
continuing or terminating a pregnancy. The main objective of screening is to identify 
women in whom a risk factor is deemed high enough to warrant offering diagnostic 
testing. Alongside prenatal measures designed to detect Down’s syndrome are social 
support services for children with the condition, together with social movements 
and both autobiographical and media accounts on parenting a child with the 
condition (Thomas, 2014a, 2014b). The discourses of such outlets often portray living 
with the condition in positive terms and, essentially, as a situation one should not 
inevitably interpret as tragic or unwanted (Thomas, 2014a, 2014b). 
Fieldwork took place at two healthcare institutions and included over 200 
hours of observations of consultations and other medical work (office chat, 
cytogenetic laboratories, team meetings, etc.), interviews with 16 practitioners and 37 
parents, and document analysis (pregnancy booklets, policy documents). 
Approximately one year (December 2011–December 2012, in clinic for once/twice a 
week) was spent observing each setting, paying attention to routines, deviations, 
discourses, practices of division, and accounts. The study primarily explored why 
the scientific and medical communities, together with parents, are so invested in the 
idea of prenatally detecting Down’s syndrome. Only data collected via participant 
observation at one NHS hospital (i.e. its antenatal department) will be discussed 
here. The chaotic and complex department was occupied by midwives, doctors, 
consultants, maternity care assistants, and administrative staff along with patients. 
Data for each study were analysed by exploring and dissecting the 
connections and disconnections, themes, deviations (Silverman, 1993), metaphors, 
and typifications in accounts and observations of the clinic. This tactic added rigour 
to our arguments so that we could make claims on strong grounds, and thicken 
descriptions as well as our interpretations. Ethical approval was granted by NHS 
and/or University research ethics committees for both studies. Further information 
on the methodology of each study is available elsewhere (Latimer, 2013; Thomas, 
2014b). 
 
Absence, Presence, Displacement: Down’s Syndrome 
We begin our analysis by capturing how persons or things are made absent or 
present in everyday practices. Here, we can see who/what is being marginalised and 
privileged. Investigating the presence of absence involves ‘what is not said and who 
is not present in a localised context’ (Pascale, 2011: 145). Absence has recently been a 
topic of consideration in STS literature (Rappert and Bauchspies, 2014) in terms of 
what is not constituted as a proper object for scientific investigation as well as what 
is done with the un/known. Thus, one aspect of absence we press here is what is not 
attended to in the production of biomedical knowledge and what is made invisible, 
silenced, or made to be so taken-for-granted that it falls outside of biomedical 
discourse. 
To illustrate this point, we draw on the following extract from Thomas’ 
project detailing a Down’s syndrome screening consultation involving Nicola 
(midwife) and Mrs 
Li (mother): 
 
Nicola: I’m going to tell you about the screen and then I’m going to take you through 
so you can have your bloods done. You’re offered the screening test today. It won’t 
tell you if the baby has Down’s syndrome but it provides a risk ratio which gives a 
lower-risk or higher-risk of the condition. If you’re a higher-risk, we telephone you 
within three to five working days where you’re invited back here. You’ll receive 
counselling and you’re offered a further diagnostic test called an amniocentesis. 
Have you heard of it? 
Mrs Li: Yes. I had one in the last pregnancy. I’m going back to Cambodia in a few 
days’ time for three weeks. What can we do? I’m back [date] when I’m having the 
[anomaly scan]. 
Nicola: The amniocentesis should take place in three and a half weeks because if you 
wanted to terminate, it’s leaving it very late in the pregnancy. [Mrs Li looks 
concerned] If you came back as higher-risk, would you have an amniocentesis? 
Because if not, you might have to think whether having this test would be the best 
option. You could be higher-risk but it could all still be OK. 
Mrs Li: I would rather know if I was higher-risk. 
Nicola: OK. If you ring in six days’ time, we might have your result. If you’re higher-
risk, we can book you an amniocentesis over the phone. But you should really 
consider this because obviously the baby will be at such an advanced gestation for 
amniocentesis and potentially a termination. 
Mrs Li: I understand. 
Nicola: How old are you? 
Mrs Li: Thirty-three. 
Nicola: If you did want an amniocentesis, you would be counselled beforehand. It 
has a 1% risk of miscarriage and if there’s a diagnosis, you’re offered a termination of 
pregnancy. You could come back as lower-risk but lower-risk does not necessarily 
mean no risk [of having a child with Down’s syndrome]. OK? 
Mrs Li: OK. 
 
This extract highlights many important issues: the figuring of mothers as ‘lower-risk’ 
or ‘higher-risk’; the relationship between an increased maternal age and a diagnosis 
of Down’s syndrome (‘how old are you?’), and; the notion of nondirective care being 
difficult to uphold (‘you might have to think whether having this test would be the 
best option’). Importantly, although Down’s syndrome is cited, no further details on 
it are tendered by Nicola nor solicited by Mrs Li. In this consultation and many 
others, Down’s syndrome is framed as a taken-for-granted category requiring no 
further explanation of symptoms, prognosis, and the social realities of the child who 
may have the condition. In addition, prior to screening, Nicola cites termination on 
three occasions, drawing on this as a resource to highlight the gravity of decision-
making and how delaying this becomes increasingly problematic as a pregnancy 
progresses. However, the conjectural option of continuing a pregnancy following a 
diagnosis is never established. Thomas observed similar occasions in other screening 
consultations, including the condition being seldom addressed in explicit detail. At 
most, Down’s syndrome is cited without any further clarification. 
We argue that Down’s syndrome is an example of absence in antenatal 
medicine. Attending to the everyday life of the clinic shows how the condition 
becomes a ‘known’ entity, with practitioners not providing, and parents not 
soliciting or questioning, details of it. Its absence acts as a stiff mould which masks 
the sizeable physiological and intellectual variation of people with the condition. It 
becomes widely constructed as a congenital condition effacing and despoiling 
identity (Goffman, 1963), so much so that it has become absent as a topic worthy of 
further reflection in biomedical practice. It is in its familiarity as something 
‘abnormal’ – as something one can terminate a pregnancy for – that it becomes 
invisible, thus masking an open and vital discussion regarding the complexity and 
variation of the condition. So whilst Down’s syndrome screening is, as we will show 
later, problematically present as the topic of prenatal investigation, the condition as a 
diagnosis or as a state of being in the world is made absent. 
 
Absence, Presence, Displacement: Dysmorphology 
In this article, we illuminate something which is above and beyond 
absence/presence. Specifically, we find that at some moments in the clinic, certain 
things are made absent which are then given presence at other moments. It is this 
movement that accomplishes less explicit relations of ordering and accomplishes the 
bio-politics which affords the disposal and exclusion of some forms of life at the 
same time it reproduces biomedical power. 
To explore this, we focus now on how babies and children as ‘individual 
persons’ are made absent and present in the dysmorphology clinic. ‘Individual’ 
personhood, for Euro-Americans, is figured in terms of the sovereign subject against 
which other kinds of ‘being’ are held as ‘Other’ (de Beauvoir, 2010 [1949]: 61). 
Figuring individual personhood is complex but involves notions of the discrete un-
breached body together with notions of possession, will, and reason. What we find 
in the dysmorphology clinic are moments when, no matter how effaced and 
despoiled by a syndrome a child’s body is, they can still be brought into presence as 
an individual person. This relates to the processes of objectification which constitute 
parent and practitioner relations. What is being objectified, rather than personified, 
are the bodies of babies, children and their relations – both the living child as well as 
future children. Thus, what is accomplished in the construction of these 
objectifications is not just the medicalisation of family and future reproduction but 
the association of family and reproduction with the ab/normality of the shape and 
form of bodies/minds as well as with diseases and problems with development and 
behaviour. 
Here, we show how there is a shift between the objectifying practices that 
bring the body as an object into presence in the clinic, but which make personhood 
absent, and those practices that background the body to make the person present. 
This contradicts Young’s (1997) work on how the body intrudes personhood into the 
clinic, despite all those practices that attempt to enact the mind-body split. Consider 
the case of Roger, around eight years old. The following extract is taken from a 
consultation in the paediatric outpatients department between the consultant 
geneticist (Dr Smith) and Roger and his family (mother, grandmother): 
 
Dr Smith: I’ve reviewed his notes and I don’t think there’s anything [a diagnosis], 
we’ve established a few things. 
Mother: I was so relieved when I got your letter [saying the condition has nothing to 
do with her kidney disease during pregnancy]. I blamed myself all these years. 
Dr Smith: We can completely rule that out. There’s some type of genetic problem 
likely to have occurred with him, there’s nothing running through your family. 
We’ve looked for fragile X and chromosomes […] [Roger] was really good [on the 
examination table]. I’m interested in movements because a new gene has been 
identified; these boys have learning difficulties and some funny movements. We’re 
setting up this test in [place] and we could add Roger if you would like to go down 
that route. That’s the only idea I have at the moment. I may have others in the future. 
 
Like many parents in the study, Roger’s mother blamed herself for his troubles but 
the geneticist exonerates her from blame and installs Roger’s genes as the possible 
cause of his troubles. Whilst parents and family members are enrolled in the 
processes of objectification through which a child’s troubles and its causes come into 
view, the effect of magnifying the gene and diminishing parental agency regularly 
occurs during consultations1. In the clinic, what is being enacted is the purity of the 
clinical gaze (Foucault 1973) through practices that bring into presence the syndrome 
as located in the medical body, both the individual body of the child as well as the 
bodies of the biological family. Thus, in consultations with families and at local team 
meetings in the dysmorphology clinic, when practitioners present slides and discuss 
cases, the living babies and children that formed the objects of dysmorphology are, 
at key moments, brought into presence as individual persons. 
In another consultation with Roger and his family, Dr Smith discusses the use 
of Ritalin. The staff and family engage in processes through which Roger’s 
hyperactivity is brought into presence as a key feature of his ‘condition’. Amanda 
(specialist genetics nurse) states that his Ritalin will wear off soon, while Roger’s 
mother and Dr Smith discuss how the Ritalin has changed his behaviour – pressing 
how things are ‘much better’. Then two things happen. First, the grandmother raises 
the issue of how Roger still ‘twitches’. Second, the mother reverts to pressing issues 
around his hyperactivity (problems getting Roger to sleep). It is at this moment that 
Roger’s mother’s concern – around managing his hyperactivity - gets displaced by 
Dr Smith. She does this by bringing Roger into presence as a person of a particular 
kind – a person with likes and dislikes (’he doesn’t like to be on his own’) and with a 
will (‘he likes to have a grip on you’). By doing this, Dr Smith divides Roger’s 
behaviour into those things that are to do with ‘him’, as a person (not wanting to go 
to bed, keeping a grip on his mother), from issues that are of clinical significance. 
Roger’s mother, displaced by this redefinition of Roger’s behaviour, acts as if her 
parenting skills have been called to account: ‘I’m starting to limit how long I stay up 
there’. Dr Smith subsequently engages in repair work and reasserts that Roger 
keeping his mother up at night is not a clinical problem since it is something all 
children can do: ‘I know it’s difficult with all children, I know in my family it’s not 
much different’. 
In this shifting between absencing and presencing individual personhood, Dr 
Smith brings into presence her own humanity and sociality as well as that of Roger. 
At the same time, she asserts her authority as both a clinician, dividing the relevant 
from the irrelevant, on the one hand, and by displacing the mother’s concern and 
disciplining her as a parent, on the other. Shifting between making personhood 
present, rather than the ‘disease’, is one way biomedical power is being 
accomplished. But it also exemplifies how the doctor shifts between making herself 
present as the proponent of the disciplined gaze, who can divide the pathological 
and abnormal from the normal, and a social being. But bringing a child into presence 
as an individual person alongside giving the genetic agency for their bodily troubles 
also has the effect of giving the child ‘shelter’ (Latimer, 1999). Here, what we want to 
press is how the clinic, by bringing the child into presence as an individual person, 
includes them by giving them ‘face’ and ‘place’ (Latimer, 2013) in ways that mean 
that the clinic, society, parents, and family all have a moral and social responsibility 
to them. The next extract illustrates our claims: 
 
David (8 year old boy with seizures, motor problems, and severe delay) leaves the 
clinic with his mother and father: 
Dr Smith: Isn’t he lovely? 
Dr Jones: Fab, you just get glimpses… 
Dr Smith: …of what he could be like. Do you think he’ll ever speak? 
Dr Jones: No. He can communicate though. He has a good understanding of how the 
world works and how to get people to do what he wants. 
Dr Smith: The majority of kids with polymicrogyria are very happy children. 
Dr Jones: So chromosomes 21 and 22. 
Dr Smith: Yes, I expect them to be normal but worth looking for. There’s one X 
linked gene where they have narrowed down where it could be, that will be 
interesting for him, he fits that mould. [It would be useful for the daughter] and 
people like to know why. 
Other Dr: If they don’t find it they are chasing rainbows. 
 
Dr Smith goes on to define David as a ‘classic Polymicrogyria’: dribbling, gait, no 
speech, developmental problems, co-ordination problems, and epilepsy. 
 
Throughout this encounter, Dr Smith brings David into presence as a person; he’s 
unique, not as severe as other children she knows about, and will reach adulthood. 
While the doctors discuss the possibility that David’s genes have caused his 
problems, they bring him back into presence as an individual person: ‘sometimes 
you just get glimpses of what he could be like’, ‘[h]e has a good understanding of 
how the world works and how to get people to do what he wants’. This means as the 
clinicians draw upon a notion that the child’s condition is biologically determined 
rather than socially or culturally constructed, they also hold to an idea that there is 
an essence to persons; that a child, despite abnormalities on the surface and in the 
depths of the body, is a person. As such, David is given shelter. He is included, 
restored momentarily as a subject to whom particular rights accrue. 
However, an extraordinary feature of dysmorphology is that the diagnostic 
and humanitarian work of inclusion is done alongside genetic counselling. This 
means that at the same time as the living child is given shelter through bringing 
them into presence at moments as an individual person, the geneticisation of their 
troubles means parents, and their reproductive relations, become the site of intense 
risk. For example, in one extraordinarily swift move, Dr Smith also brings into 
presence the possibility that the family need to know whether they might reproduce 
another child like David, with the implicit understanding that a reproduction of 
another David is ‘disposable’ (Latimer, 1997; Munro, 2001): ‘[It would be useful for 
the daughter] and people like to know why.’ That is, it would be useful for the 
daughter and other people to know whether there is a genetic problem with David 
because they can assess the risk of someone with his condition being reproduced. 
David is held on the grounds of the human by bringing him into presence as an 
individual person, one with needs and rights, yet what is also brought into presence 
is the possibility that another person like him might need to be prevented. 
By tracking dysmorphology over time and across situated occasions, absences 
and presences (and thus inclusions and exclusions) could be traced and 
discrepancies could be identified. Earlier in the article, we defined this trend as 
motility, of how people or things are moved in different spaces of discourse and can 
be made important or unimportant, present or absent, at different moments. This 
achieves socio-cultural relations of power and enacts attachment to – and 
detachment from – specific ethical concerns and moral forms. In short, in the 
dysmorphology clinic, the everyday practices of inclusion and exclusion can 
‘dispose’ of particular forms of life at the same time as they give shelter to others. 
Thus, future children constituting reproductions of a living dysmorphic child are, 
quickly and tacitly, configured as excludable and transformed into the Other in the 
everyday ordering work of the clinic. 
 Attachment, Motility, Disposal 
We have revealed how in moments of motility, ‘shifts’ (Latimer, 1997) allow for 
sudden switches between conceptual relations embedded in narratives and 
discourses. Shifts produce moves which mean presence is, at critical moments, 
magnified or diminished. Here, we build on the notions of motility and disposal in 
our analysis by drawing on the ethnography of screening for Down’s syndrome and 
how cases become categorised by practitioners. 
Classificatory practices are crucial to the ongoing work of medicine, 
particularly in terms of classifying certain bodies/future bodies as either normal or 
abnormal. In prenatal medicine, Down’s syndrome is very problematic for 
practitioners and parents. Although screening/testing (and thus termination) is 
offered for the condition, the prognosis of a foetus with Down’s syndrome is highly 
uncertain. The foetus is often viable yet the inconsistency of the condition’s 
manifestation and ambiguity around symptoms is a common feature. This presents a 
thorny dilemma for practitioners – namely those in the foetal medicine department 
where Thomas (2014b) spent time during fieldwork – who must provide information 
to parents and concurrently negotiate the tricky terrain of deciding which situations 
constitute legal grounds for a termination. He found that this involves disrupting the 
distinction between the foetus and baby. During a pregnancy, ultrasound scans often 
give rise to a foetus becoming a baby (particularly early on). Yet once a diagnosis of 
Down’s syndrome is established or suspected, a baby is transformed, once again, 
into a foetus. This dehumanising discourse technical discourse is used to settle the 
uncertainty and complexity of Down’s syndrome; the foetus is universally and 
narrowly framed as ‘abnormal’. Together with its ‘absence’ in the early stages of 
antenatal care, Down’s syndrome thus is enacted as a negative outcome. 
To highlight this further, consider the following extract taken from a 
consultation with Dr Karman (consultant), Elena (midwife), and Mr/Mrs Holt 
(parents) whose baby has an abnormal aortic arch: 
 
Dr Karman: So would you like a late amniocentesis? 
Mrs Hunt: I plan not to because I want to concentrate on the heart side of things. And 
I've heard from a few of the people that if something was wrong, a number of other 
problems would have been detected by now. 
Dr Karman: Not in all cases do all other problems show up in the scans or diagnostic 
tests. The heart is linked to other stuff but this may be the only sign. A heart defect 
will indicate abnormality in 5% of cases and the only way you can know whether 
there are any problems is by an amniocentesis. But the likelihood is that the baby’s 
chromosomal development is normal. That’s 95% likely [Dr Karman smiles. The 
Hunts smile back]. 
Elena: You should book an appoint to come here again so we can keep an eye on 
everything. 
Dr Karman: Yes [the Hunts nod]. Can you bring baby into the department after he or 
she is born? 
Mrs Hunt: Sure. 
Mr Hunt: Of course. 
Dr Karman: I’d like to add a photograph of him or her to the [cleft] board. 
Elena: Yes. If something is wrong, it's good for parents to see a picture with the 
problem and see that there is still a baby here. 
Dr Karman: Absolutely [smiles at Mr and Mrs Hunt]. 
Mrs Hunt: Yes it’s nice to know that you’re [slightly pauses]. 
Dr Karman: [Interrupting] It’s nice to see the baby ahead of the problem. 
Elena: Definitely. 
Mrs Hunt: Definitely. It’s nice to see that you're not on your own. 
 
Once more, plenty is going on here, including the difficulties of offering non-
directive care. For instance, Dr Karman’s claim that ‘other problems’ may be hidden 
and that an amniocentesis is ‘the only way’ to establish an absence or presence of 
‘abnormality’ may incite anxiety in the Hunts and influence them to make certain 
decisions. In addition, we note Dr Karman’s preference for ‘baby’ over ‘foetus’ once 
a pregnancy is compatible with life rather than incompatible with life, that is, a condition 
which may not require a termination of pregnancy to be offered. This is a frequent 
occurrence in the clinic. 
Dr Karman also asks Mr/Mrs Hunt – despite a specific problem not 
necessarily being diagnosed other than an abnormal aortic arch – if they would bring 
their new-born baby into the clinic so a photograph can added to the ‘cleft board’, a 
large picture display of recently born babies with cleft lip/palate and other 
conditions. If ‘something is wrong’, Elena deduces, others in a similar situation will 
benefit from seeing ‘that there is still a baby here’, with Dr Karman claiming ‘it’s nice 
to see the baby ahead of the problem. Re-birthing the (normal) baby status once a 
problem occurs is of paramount importance in the clinic. The cleft board is crucial 
here, playing to a child’s future of normality (Silverman 1987). As Francine 
(midwife) explains, it allows parents to see ‘that their babies could be diagnosed 
with certain abnormalities but at the end of the day, they still look normal’. Such 
technologies reveal the importance of ‘normality’, as a perceived visual absence of 
abnormality, in constituting foetuses/babies. 
Interestingly, no picture of a new-born baby with Down’s syndrome adorned 
the cleft board, reflecting the absence of the condition in screening consultations. We 
suggest that such practices – the absence of Down’s syndrome in consultations/the 
cleft board, and using the term ‘foetus’ over ‘baby’ when discussing a possible 
termination of pregnancy for the condition – permit the disposal, exclusion, and 
effacement of the condition in antenatal care. Silverman’s (1987) analysis of how the 
child with Down’s syndrome is ‘socially constituted’ in the clinic is comparable here. 
He examines how illness or wellness are discursively organised in consultations 
between professionals and parents, and how clinical versions of situations 
incorporate and transform parental formulations of their child. Specifically, children 
with Down’s syndrome and cardiac defects are constituted as ‘social objects’ in 
which the (medical) concerns of parents are reconstructed by professionals as ‘social’ 
issues, thus enacting a non-intervention policy and avoiding surgical intervention on 
behalf of the child’s condition (1987: 134). Silverman captures how communication 
techniques are not neutral devices but derive from powerful discourses in which the 
ground is prepared for children with Down’s syndrome to be positioned in the social 
rather than medical realm. Treatment is not offered and, in turn, this allows for their 
‘disposal’. 
Although Silverman (1981) discusses ‘disposal’, this corresponds to 
postponing further medical treatment (here, disposal can arguably be substituted for 
‘discharged’). We use the term to signify something different. In the case of Mr/Mrs 
Hunt, the viability of the foetus allows Dr Karman to make a move to re-normalise 
the baby. Since a chromosomal abnormality is unlikely, the baby status is retained 
and an invitation for submitting a photograph to be placed onto the cleft board is 
tendered. In contrast, when the foetus/baby has or is suspecting of having Down’s 
syndrome, the baby is transformed into a foetus. Such moves restore the local order, 
namely by settling the ambiguous category of Down’s syndrome (as ‘viable’ but as 
something one screens, tests, and possibly terminates for) and reinforce the 
boundary between normal (babies) and abnormal (foetuses). In what follows, this 
allows for the disposal, both figurative and literal, of a foetus with the condition. 
 
Discussion 
Our focus in this article is on how medical work is organised and performed in 
everyday routines and how in/exclusion becomes enacted in such practices. 
Specifically, it has two major contributions. First, we identify the value of bringing 
together different conceptual tools (from interactionism, post-structuralism, and 
ethnomethodology) to analyse the mundane and ordinary routines deeply 
embedded in the fabric of medical work which reproduce certain power relations 
and cultural values. Although early interactionist work in the clinic (e.g. Davis, 1982; 
Silverman, 1987; Strong, 1979) demonstrates these features, we extend this by 
examining how the use of technology is implicated, and thus negotiated, in such 
interactions. The bio-politics of everyday life reveals how technologies, and policies 
concerning them, are translated and ethically-laden, ideas which are absent from this 
earlier research. In addition, our account is a more complex and nuanced analysis of 
the micro-physics of power. As identified, power relations – including 
in/exclusionary practices – are always local and specific yet also intricate and 
heterogeneous. A focus on power relations involves us drawing on motility to 
examine how practitioners shift backward and forward between distinct discursive 
forms. The notion of motility deserves greater attention in sociology, and 
particularly in analysing the everyday life of the clinic and beyond. In promoting its 
use, we hope to advance the theoretical understanding of the sociologies of everyday 
life and recognise the value of analysing the hidden and ordinary which, although 
establishing routines, are rarely straightforward (Pink, 2012). 
We similarly place everyday life at the centre of our analysis, drawing on 
cutting-edge ethnographies to show the accounts, interactions, practices, affects, 
ambivalences, and, in/exclusions which surface when studying the everyday. In 
doing so, we press that ethnographic endeavours allow us to interrogate the 
dynamics of everyday life and capture its concreteness and intricacy (Pink, 2012). By 
analysing the micro and banal, we show how the familiar constitutes, and is 
constitutive of, the complexities, processes, and interactions of the clinic. What is 
more, as well as showing the importance of absence/presence and motility, we 
extend the concept of disposal which, hitherto, has yet to receive the attention it 
deserves. Silverman (1987) discusses disposal in relation to how children with 
Down’s syndrome are not given a medical future but this does not go beyond the 
clinic walls. Here, we capture what is implicit and outside (as well as inside) the 
clinic, that is, the wider disposal and exclusion of certain (abnormal) bodies. 
Second, the article identifies how values around bodies/future bodies 
intersect with clinical work and reproductive technologies in everyday practices. 
Agreeing with Silverman (1987) that ideas around medicine and kinship are 
discursively constituted in consultations, we show how babies/future babies are 
figured in ways which allow for their possible absence or presence, and thus 
inclusion or exclusion. Taken together, our studies address the complex interplay of 
practices and discourses in deconstructing both dysmorphology and Down’s 
syndrome. In short, in showing how medicine is re-accomplished in ritual and 
mundane forms, we recognise how the everyday life of the clinic has transformed 
reproductive medicine, shaped the (bio)politics of reproduction (Ginsburg and 
Rapp, 1991), and re-enacted certain body-society relations. Our soft data asks hard 
questions about some of the most profound dilemmas of our time, specifically how 
the clinic is productive and reproductive of ideas around persons, kinships, and 
being human. 
Our intention here is not to propose specific policies or discourses designed to 
change or improve practice. More modestly, we hope that by analysing the everyday 
and by theorising the mundane, this article will ignite reflexive, ethical, and 
pluralistic dialogues – and so better communication between practitioners, parents, 
and the wider lay public – around reproductive technologies and medical 
conditions. Reproductive technologies undoubtedly change the way we think and 
act and alter our perceptions of self, other, and what is ab/normal. Spilling beyond 
the biological and into public arenas and intimate lives, they are a potent site for 
uncovering assumptions buried deep in medical work and for exploring how ideas 
around family, parenthood, and personhood are enacted. By analysing the ‘terrible 
ordinariness’ (Bosk, 1992) of clinical life, we can highlight vital questions for 
practitioners, parents, governments, and sociologists alike around what lives we 
consider valuable and ‘normal’ as a society. 
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Notes 
1. Many families engage in the surveillance, assessment, and evaluation of their 
family relations with respect to the new genetics (Featherstone et al. 2006). 
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